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In the post-“Arab Spring” world, stolen asset recovery is quickly emerging as one of the
more high profile aspects of the global fight against corruption and promoting the “rule of law.”
Typically based on allegations of wrongdoing by presidents, prime ministers, and dictators—
enriching themselves through corruption, theft, embezzlement, bribery, and self-dealing at the
expense of their people—senior-level grand corruption cases form an integral part of the
histories of many developing countries in the 20th century.
Often limiting national economic growth, grand corruption creates countless hardships that
fall largely on the poor.2 In the past century, such theft has financed the lavish lifestyles for a
few corrupt elite. But even more problematic is the fact that corrupt political leaders have used
illicit assets to secure political power through co-option—bribing individuals to cooperate or
paying for the elimination of those who would not. From Haiti’s Jean Claude Duvalier to
Nigeria’s Sani Abacha to the Philippines’ Ferdinand Marcos, leaders have hidden their vast
wealth by keeping it offshore in countries with strong banking secrecy provisions. Consequently,
they have frustrated the pursuits of successor governments’ law enforcement officials, forcing
them to sift through a maze of shell companies, false names, and bank accounts, while requiring
cooperation from often indifferent foreign states.
The process of recovering stolen monies from corrupt leaders—known as ‘stolen asset
recovery’—is filled with legal and practical difficulties, including insufficient legal precedent,
lack of cooperation from offshore financial centers, and domestic political interference. Asset
recovery efforts may also be jeopardized because of the difficulty of proving criminal conduct
when leaders are dead or have fled the country.3
Despite the billions of dollars involved, recovering stolen assets is not focused simply on
money. It may also be seen as a tool to aid in deterrence as well as in fighting the impunity that is
1
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so often associated with financial crime. Indeed, in many cases, stolen asset recovery serves
three distinct purposes: recovering monies to fund governments programs and initiatives that
help their people, providing a semblance of justice for victims while often challenging a political
culture of impunity, and deterring officials from engaging in future corruption.4 Although
challenging to accomplish, such purposes are perceived as worthwhile by many in the
development, human rights, and law enforcement communities.
Indeed, all three of these communities are currently involved in a particular ongoing
exercise in asset recovery that has seen various amounts of international attention over the last
year: the case of former Haitian President Jean Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier. For better or
worse, Duvalier—his kleptocratic rule, legendary escape into exile, subsequent struggle to retain
his allegedly plundered millions, and recent return to Haiti—serves as an interesting case study
on the connection between politics, poverty, corruption, and stolen asset recovery issues.
Considering the grand corruption allegations involving such recently deposed leaders as Zine El
Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia and Moammar Gaddafi of Libya, this article suggests that a review
of the Duvalier matter—including the links between poverty and corruption and the subsequent
efforts to recover Duvalier’s assets—may provide some “lessons learned” to future corruption
hunters working in the wake of the “Arab Spring.”
I. HAITI AND THE LINKS BETWEEN CORRUPTION AND POVERTY

¶6

¶7

¶8

Haiti has many challenges, but it was not supernaturally cursed to be the poorest country in
the Western Hemisphere. One major factor for its plight is Haiti’s consistent inability to combat
government corruption.5
Even before the 2010 earthquake wiped out most of its infrastructure, Haiti’s businesses
struggled because innovation, investment, and efficiency were often discouraged. According to
many experts, corruption was and likely will continue to be Haiti’s most serious long-term
problem.6 Such a problem cannot be measured solely by the amounts of government funds
embezzled or bribes received, but must take into consideration the numerous negative social,
cultural, and political impacts it has on Haiti. Nevertheless, some numbers do capture the
magnitude of the theft; a joint report by the World Bank and United Nations suggests that
Duvalier stole the equivalent of approximately 1.7 to 4.5 percent of Haiti’s entire GDP for every
year he was in power.7
Under the Duvalier regime that lasted from 1971 until 1986, economic growth stagnated,
poverty increased, and the legitimized use of violence by the Tonton Macoute secret police led to
a constant state of fear. Having taken over the “Presidency-For-Life” after his father’s death in
1971, Duvalier’s rule is sometimes characterized as a combination of greed and laziness,
resulting in a paralysis of national development.8
4
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Development Policy, Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.aei.org/docLib/AddressingSystemicCorruptioninHaiti.pdf.
7
U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME & WORLD BANK, STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY (STAR) INITIATIVE: CHALLENGES,
OPPORTUNITIES, AND ACTION PLAN 10 (2007), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/StARSept07-full.pdf.
8
KRIS HINTERSEER, CRIMINAL FINANCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONEY LAUNDERING IN A COMPARATIVE
LEGAL CONTEXT 61 (2002).
5

20

Vol. 10:1]
¶9

Mark V. Vlasic & Gregory Cooper

For fifteen years, Duvalier was allegedly stealing Haitian and international donor money
while exploiting his people for the benefit of sugar companies.9 These assets allegedly paid for
luxury cars, large quantities of jewelry, as well as high-end vacations and property in Europe.10
Duvalier gave up the “Presidency-for-Life’” only when faced with the near total breakdown of
the Haitian state, which was evidenced by rioting and a potential coup d’état. Duvalier’s
consolation prize was a comfortable exile in France, where he relied on stashed assets and
continued living the lifestyle to which he had been accustomed.11
II. ASSET RECOVERY AS A MEANS TO TACKLE CORRUPTION

¶10

Tragically, Haiti’s poverty at the hands of a few ruling elite is not unique, but rather a
worldwide problem. Too often, such grand corruption cases go unpunished. In a few rare cases,
however, corrupt individuals and their beneficiaries have been brought to account and countries
have been able to use the asset recovery process to recover a significant portion of stolen state
assets.12 For example, almost thirty years of tracing assets hidden by Ferdinand Marcos led to
the Philippines’ success in recovering $1.8 billion in foreign and domestic assets.13 Similarly,
Nigerian asset recovery efforts against former President Sani Abacha led to the recovery of
nearly $1.9 billion in stolen assets.14
¶11
In the years following these legendary asset recovery successes, enhanced law enforcement
tools, as well as increased capacity, and improved international cooperation from well-meaning
countries and financial centers have helped further the fight against impunity.
¶12
Of the handful of legacy asset recovery cases of the 20th century, such as Abacha and
Marcos, whose alleged financial plunders are unequalled, the case of Duvalier is still unfolding.
A subject of protracted legal maneuvering and litigation for decades, Swiss, Haitian, World Bank
and United Nations efforts to freeze and repatriate Duvalier’s allegedly illicit assets are once
again in the spotlight.
¶13
This spotlight was activated in early 2011 when Duvalier, after twenty-five years of exile
in France, returned to Haiti just days before a new Swiss law came into effect that would enable
the return of his frozen assets to Haiti.15 Despite recent high-level attention to the matter,

9
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however, the Duvalier case, like many asset recovery cases, has been a slow and laborious
process that has taken decades to unfold.16
III. INITIAL ASSET RECOVERY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST DUVALIER
¶14

While there was great interest in asset recovery at the beginning of Duvalier’s exile, the
vast majority of Duvalier’s assets were never recovered, largely due to two major setbacks.
First, a French civil court dismissed Haiti’s recovery efforts for $120 million in 1987, leaving his
assets in France untouched.17 Second, and perhaps more important, Haiti’s deteriorating political
situation led to the weakening of political will to continue pursuing Duvalier’s illicit assets.
¶15
This lack of political will was highlighted in 1989 by an attorney working on Duvalier’s
case on behalf of the Haitian government. According to The New York Times, despite sending
twenty-five requests for assistance to Haitian officials regarding cases in New York, by
September 1988, Haiti’s government had “inexplicably stopped cooperating—and, not so
incidentally, stopped paying its legal bills.”18 A letter from Haiti’s outside counsel to Haiti’s
then Prime Minister, Prosper Avril, underlines the frustration:
The behavior of your ministers leaves us no alternative except to conclude that
your ministers apparently want our efforts on behalf of Haiti to fail, are not
concerned that Haiti will lose the substantial investment it has made in pursuing
the Duvaliers, and want the Duvaliers to keep the money they stole.19
Later asset recovery efforts in the United States, renewed by the Haitian government of President
Aristide, yielded only minimal results, with the most well-known being the recovery of $350,000
from Duvalier’s wife’s account at the Bank of New York.20 Some believe that, had Haiti not
dropped the original Duvalier asset recovery, the Haitian government could have recovered
between $25 and $75 million by 1990.21 Instead, the resulting debacle left Duvalier free and the
majority of his assets untouched. Meanwhile, Haiti was stuck with a 1.2 million dollar legal bill
and with justice denied.22
¶16
The outcome in Haiti is not unusual. Many countries are deterred from instituting
recoveries based on the threat or actual absence of political will and incompatible or uncaring
foreign legal systems. To enforce a recovery, for example, many countries require a criminal
conviction, which could be impossible to obtain if the perpetrator is dead or in exile, or if a
conviction would cause significant political unrest in a country, as in the case of President Daniel

16
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17
Jonathan Randal, Haiti Loses Lawsuit Against Duvalier: French Court Sets Back Bid to Recover $150 Million,
WASH. POST, Jun. 24, 1987, at A22.
18
David Margolick, At the Bar: Law firm, in Pursuit of Haitian Property, Finds the Chase Can Be Tedious and
Frustrating, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1989, at B7.
19
Id.
20
Yvette Collymore, HAITI: U.S. Court Moves Against Duvalier Assets, INTER PRESS SERVICE (Jan. 3, 1996),
http://ipsnews.net/print.asp?idnews=66324.
21
Margolick, supra note 18.
22
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Arap Moi in Kenya.23 Absent a criminal process, legal systems of these countries may prevent
any forfeiture of assets.
IV. ADVANCES IN ASSET RECOVERY AND THE DUVALIER CASE
A.

The international community focuses greater attention on grand corruption

¶17

Since the failure of the early Duvalier recovery efforts, the international community has
strengthened its commitment to fight grand corruption, regulate the role of offshore financial
centers, and engage in asset recovery.24 In addition to increased financial controls and
mandatory diligence procedures in much of the banking industry (largely in response to
international terrorism), a turning point came in 2005 when 140 countries signed the United
Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), the world’s first truly global treaty against
corruption.25
¶18
More recently, the international community has become increasingly focused on asset
recovery. In September 2007, the World Bank President, Robert Zoellick, and the United
Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, launched the Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative
at the United Nations General Assembly. Designed as a unique joint World Bank-United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) partnership, StAR was established to help
developing countries track down and recover stolen assets from past grand corruption cases.26
¶19
Unlike many initiatives launched at the U.N. General Assembly, what may have made
StAR unique is that it was also Zoellick’s first initiative at the Bank. With Zoellick’s energetic
backing and support, StAR and the concept of “asset recovery” were subsequently included into
numerous G-20 statements and commitments. As a result, some of the most influential countries
and national leaders in the world have signed on to the link between development, poverty, and
fighting corruption with stolen asset recovery, thereby elevating asset recovery to the forefront of
the development agenda.27
¶20
One of StAR’s first asset recovery cases involved working with Haiti’s new leadership and
Swiss authorities to help recover approximately $5.7 million of Duvalier’s assets frozen in
Switzerland28—an effort that had begun years earlier, but which was getting a second chance due
23
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http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g20/summit-sommet/2010/G20_seoul_annex-annexes%203.aspx?view=d.
28
Mark V. Vlasic & Jenae N. Noell, Fighting impunity: Recent international asset recovery efforts to combat
corruption, CAYMAN FINANCIAL REVIEW, Jan. 5, 2010, http://www.compasscayman.com/cfr/2010/01/05/Fightingimpunity--Recent-international-asset-recovery-efforts-to-combat-corruption/#comment.

23

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

[2011

to enlightened leadership on all sides. In this renewed effort, Swiss authorities sought to
confiscate Duvalier’s assets and return them to Haiti to support non-profit humanitarian
organizations while simultaneously sparring against Duvalier’s legislative efforts to lift the
freezing order.
B. Swiss double their efforts to confiscate assets via new legislation
¶21

A “perfect storm” of positive factors, including a supportive Haitian government and a
helpful StAR Initiative, combined with Swiss determination to resolve the Duvalier matter once
and for all, has led to significant legal successes in Switzerland. Many of these successes have
occurred in the last twenty-four months due to the hard work of a handful of Swiss officials
working with individuals from Haiti and the StAR Initiative.
¶22
In 2010, Swiss officials took the exceptional step of re-freezing Duvalier’s assets using the
government’s foreign policy powers29 while it crafted a new legislative “fix” to the Duvalier
asset recovery matter—a retroactive law that focused on corrupt assets from fragile states.30 The
Restitution of Illicit Assets Act (RIAA) was passed by the Swiss Parliament in October 2010 and
officially came into effect on February 1, 2011. The RIAA, also known as Lex Duvalier, was
designed for matters involving assets frozen in Switzerland that have been acquired unlawfully
but cannot be returned through typical international mutual legal assistance channels due to
failures in the victim state’s (the country from which the assets were stolen) judicial system.
¶23
Specifically, the RIAA allows for asset confiscation in situations where the current state of
the victim country renders it impossible to conduct a proper exchange procedure via traditional
judicial procedures. In these cases, the RIAA would allow a unique “burden shift,” requiring the
Swiss government to show that: (1) the funds held in Switzerland by an alleged corrupt official
are significantly larger than what someone could have credibly earned in office; and that (2) the
country from which the funds originate is known to be corrupt. The burden of proving that the
money came from legal sources would then shift to the allegedly corrupt official, rather than the
Swiss state. If the official could not prove a legitimate origin of his or her Swiss assets, those
assets would be confiscated by the Swiss state.
¶24
In an odd twist of events, about a week before the new RIAA came into effect in
Switzerland, Duvalier chose to emerge from the shadows and his exile in France and return to
Haiti. While some of his supporters claimed that he wanted to return to help rebuild his
earthquake-ravaged country, some thought it odd that he would wait over a year after the
earthquake to return and do so.31 Despite his return, Swiss officials are optimistic that the RIAA
will work as intended and provide for a successful recovery of the Haitian assets.32

29
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to Swiss Federal Council under this article.).
30
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31
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32
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2011), http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/finec/intcr/poexp/faqria.0008.html.

24

Vol. 10:1]

Mark V. Vlasic & Gregory Cooper

V. LESSONS FOR FUTURE “ARAB SPRING”-RELATED CASES: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UNCAC
AND GLOBAL COOPERATION

¶25

The success of possible future asset recovery cases resulting from the “Arab Spring,” such
as the Gaddafi case, rely, in large part, on the current efforts of forward-leaning countries—such
as the United States and Switzerland—that are actively taking measures to freeze possible illicit
assets. Sadly, not every country is as forward-leaning.
¶26
While no one expects every U.N. member state to design new laws to resolve decades-long
asset recovery cases, or be the most forward-leaning regarding international sanctions programs
and asset freezing orders, simply ratifying the UNCAC is a step in the right direction. Yet, many
countries have not ratified the UNCAC nor do they have the proper legal tools in place to
cooperate on asset recovery cases. This presents serious challenges to asset recovery
practitioners. One aspect of StAR’s work is therefore to encourage more countries to ratify the
UNCAC.
¶27
Even with the UNCAC in place, the challenges presented by corruption investigations and
asset recovery operations are immense. Tax haven jurisdictions often present challenges to
investigators while in many countries the political will to initiate and cooperate in asset recovery
cases is limited. Added to this, sometimes there is reluctance on the part of victim countries to
rely on foreign experts to do the investigation and legal work; many see it as ceding their
national sovereignty. Therefore, what is needed is both increased cooperation with international
legal experts as well as building local capacities to work successfully on stolen asset recovery in
respective countries.
¶28
In many ways, the United Nations Security Resolution that enabled the worldwide freezing
of Gaddafi’s assets has served as a significant test of the international community’s ability to
coordinate future asset recovery operations.33 If the Duvalier case is any example, the concern
for those involved in the “Arab Spring”-related asset recovery operations will be how to ensure
continued political will to sustain such operations—and to maintain the international cooperation
necessary to follow up on all available leads in a timely matter. One hopes that they will look at
the Duvalier matter for guidance. Asset recovery operations should be based on broad political
support to sustain such efforts. They also should engage outside and international assistance to
bridge capacity gaps quickly so that strategic momentum is not lost on the countless priorities
that face a transitioning government.
VI. CONCLUSION
¶29

In the years to come, historians and legal scholars will determine whether or not the
Duvalier case provided any true guidance for transitioning governments arising out of the “Arab
Spring.” What is certain, however, is that much good has come from the renewed effort to
recover his assets for the benefit of the Haitian people. From a global perspective, the StAR
Initiative’s work in fostering cooperation between countries, North and South, provides a
blueprint for future advocacy in grand corruption cases. At the same time, by designing the
RIAA legislation, Switzerland has gained a reputation as a world leader in asset recovery, and in
many ways, it now serves as a model to other countries.
33

See U.S., U.N., U.K., E.U. Freeze Gadhafi’s Assets, WSJ.COM CORRUPTION CURRENTS BLOG (Feb. 28, 2011),
http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/02/28/u-s-u-n-u-k-e-u-freeze-ghadafis-assets/ (Overview of the
Gaddafi freeze).
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¶30

On the domestic front in Haiti, the Duvalier matter has helped Haitian authorities gain
valuable anticorruption experience—from learning critical mutual legal assistance techniques, to
building critical international networks, to increasing the likelihood of future prosecution of
corrupt leaders.34 In the future, Haitian officials might use their experience in the Duvalier
matter to help other developing countries with their asset recovery cases—providing ever-helpful
South-South cooperation and training.
¶31
Furthermore, from a moral and policy perspective, the Duvalier case will hopefully inspire
and empower government leaders and their public constituencies to pursue asset recovery cases,
despite the challenges that are inherent in their operation. Indeed, a critical aspect in fighting the
impunity that is so often associated with economic crime, is to disgorge deposed leaders of their
illicit fortunes. Not only does asset recovery bring some sense of justice, but hopefully the
exemplary effect of denying corrupt leaders the benefits of their corruption will also inspire
successor leaders to act honestly and with integrity. Indeed, only by holding our leaders to the
highest standards can we ensure that citizens receive the good governance that they deserve.

34

Training on Corruption in Haiti, BASEL INSTITUTE ON GOVERNANCE (May 19, 2009),
http://www.baselgovernance.org/big/news-single-view/article/training-on-corruption-inhaiti/?tx_ttnews[backPid]=295&cHash=ad3f8ec6ed.
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